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Abstract 
This study measures the effect of disability insurance on labor supply and health 
insurance coverage.  The effect is identified by a policy in 1990 that increased the generosity of 
Social Security’s disabled-widow program.  Using data from the Current Population Survey, the 
results suggest that, in this context, disability benefits led to a one-to-one decline in labor force 
participation, employment, and private insurance coverage.  The results imply that the demand 
for disability benefits may not reflect a latent demand for public health insurance. 
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I. Introduction 
 Disability insurance programs in the US have grown tremendously during the last few 
decades (Autor and Duggan 2006).  This growth has raised questions among economists and 
policy analysts regarding the economic effects of disability insurance programs.  One question, 
and the focus of much research, is whether disability insurance decreases labor supply.  This 
question arises from the simultaneous growth in disability benefit receipt and the decline in labor 
force participation, particularly among older men in the US during the postwar period (Bound 
1989).  Another question is whether demand for disability benefits reflects a latent desire for 
health insurance, as beneficiaries of Social Security disability programs may qualify for 
Medicaid, Medicare, or both. 
 To explore these questions and others, this study examines the effects of a legislative 
reform in 1990 that increased the generosity of Social Security’s Spouse’s Disability Benefits 
program.  The program provides benefits to disabled widows who may not qualify for disability 
benefits based on their own work histories, but whose spouse had died while fully insured for 
Social Security benefits (widows includes widowers, unless otherwise noted).  Prior to the 
reform, the disabled-widow program operated under a stricter disability standard than the 
disabled-worker program.  In particular, the disability determination process for disabled-widow 
benefits was based on medical factors alone, while the determination for disabled-worker 
benefits was based on both medical and vocational factors.  In 1990, Congress abrogated the 
stricter standard of the disabled-widow program, which effectively increased the generosity of 
disability benefits to widows. 
 The effect of the reform on benefit receipt is immediately apparent in Figure 1.  The 
figure plots the percent of widows receiving disabled-widow benefits, ages 50 to 64, from years 
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1985 to 1999.  Before the reform, benefit receipt was roughly constant at 3.7 percent, but after 
the reform, benefit receipt increased, reaching 8.6 percent by 1996.  For comparison, the figure 
also plots the percent of the total population, including widows, who receive disabled-worker 
benefits.  Again, the figure is calculated for ages 50 to 64.  While the percent of benefit receipt 
increases gradually from 1985 to 1999, the trend does not change differentially in 1990.  Thus, 
the 5.0 percentage point increase in disabled-widow benefits is likely attributable to the reform. 
 This study measures the economic effects of the policy using a difference-in-differences 
estimator.  The data come from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey, 
spanning several years before and after the reform.  The treated group is defined as female 
widows ages 50 to 59 who do not have a high school diploma.  The focus on less educated 
widows reflects that the consideration of vocational factors in the disability determination 
process favors the less-educated and the less-skilled.  The comparison group is divorced females 
who are similarly aged and educated. 
 The results suggest that the reform increased Social Security receipt and Medicare 
coverage – the latter as an indicator of disability benefits receipt – by 5.2 and 6.3 percentage 
points, respectively.  Additionally, the reform decreased labor force participation and 
employment by an estimated 5.3 and 4.8 percentage points, respectively.  Taken together, the 
results suggest that, in this context, the expansion of disability insurance led to a one-for-one 
decline in labor force participation.  Moreover, the decline in labor force participation occurred 
among widows who would have otherwise been employed. 
 As a placebo test, the model is re-estimated for widowed and divorced females with a 
high school diploma or more.  As expected, the model yields null effects for nearly all outcomes 
variables of benefit receipt and labor supply. 
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 The model is also estimated for other outcome variables of interest.  First, the results 
show that the policy had no effect of Supplemental Security Income, a separate disability 
insurance program for the low-income disabled. This result is expected, as the policy only 
affected the disabled-widow program.  Second, the policy decreased private health insurance 
coverage by 5.5 percentage points, but did not change health insurance coverage overall.  This 
suggests that the increase in benefit receipt is not driven by a latent demand for health insurance 
coverage.  Finally, the policy may have increased rates of poverty and self-reported disability, 
though the estimates are not precise to draw any firm conclusions. 
 This study contributes to the growing literature that measures the effect of disability 
insurance benefits on labor supply.  To identify the effect, some studies rely on cross-sectional 
variation in benefit generosity (Parsons 1980; Slade 1984).  These studies suggest that receipt of 
disability benefits leads to a one-to-one decline in labor force participation.  Other studies bound 
the potential earnings of accepted applicants by the observed earnings of rejected applicants.  In 
one study, by Bound (1989), half of rejected applicants work, suggesting that at most half of 
accepted applicants could work had they been denied.  Subsequent studies include Chen and van 
der Klaauw (2008); Singleton (2012); and Wachter, Manchester, and Song (forthcoming).  These 
studies derive fairly similar conclusions as Bound (1989), though Wachter et al. find larger 
potentially larger labor supply effects for young applicants.  Recent studies rely on the identities 
of medical examiners and administrative law judges for identification.  Maestas, Mullen, and 
Strand (forthcoming) conclude that, at the margin, about 28 percent of accepted applicants are 
capable of work, while French and Song (2011) conclude that 26 percent of accepted applicants 
are capable of work.  Other studies exploit programs to the Canadian and Quebec Pension Plan 
for identification.  Gruber (2000) finds sizeable effects of disability benefits on labor force 
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participation, but Campolieti (2001, 2004) finds more modest effects.  Relative to these studies, 
the estimates from this study are at the high end; however, an important distinction between this 
study and others is that it focuses only on widowed females.  A unique contribution of this study 
is that it examines the effect of disability insurance on private health insurance coverage. 
   
II. Background 
A. Social Security Disability Insurance Programs 
 The Social Security Administration operates three disability insurance programs under 
Title II of the Social Security Act: Disability Insurance for disabled workers; Childhood 
Disability for adult, disabled children of Social Security beneficiaries; and Spouse’s Disability 
for disabled widows who deceased spouse had been insured for Social Security benefits.  
Currently, all three programs operate under the same disability standard: a beneficiary must be 
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” An applicant must satisfy all 
three requirements of the disability standard – the severity requirement, the medically-
determinable requirement, and the duration requirement – to be awarded benefits (Bloch 1992). 
 To apply the disability standard to a particular claim, the Social Security Administration 
uses a five-step sequential evaluation process.  Depending on the step, an applicant can be 
awarded benefits, denied benefits, or promoted to the next step.  The first step asks whether a 
claimant is currently engaged in a substantial gainful activity.  In 2013, substantial gainful 
activity is defined as earning more than $1,040 per month.  If yes, the applicant’s claim is 
denied; if no, the applicant proceeds to step two.  The second step asks whether the applicant has 
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an impairment that limits his or her ability to work.  If no, the claim is denied; if yes, the claim 
proceeds to step three.  The third step asks whether the applicant’s condition meets or equals the 
Social Security Administration’s Listing of Impairments, which is an enumeration of 
impairments that are both severe and identifiable.  If yes, the claim is accepted; if not, the claim 
proceeds to step four.  The fourth step asks whether the applicant can perform any previous 
work.  If yes, the claim is denied; if no, the claim proceeds to step five.  The fifth and final step 
asks whether the applicant can perform any work in the national economy.  If yes, the claim is 
denied; if no, the claim is accepted. 
 In the fifth step, the burden of proof lies with the Social Security Administration, not the 
claimant.  This means that, to deny a claim, the Social Security Administration must demonstrate 
that work exists in the national economy that the applicant can perform.  To standardize this 
determination, the Social Security Administration uses a medical-vocational grid.1  The grid 
indicates whether a claim should be denied based on four criteria: age, residual functional 
capacity, transferrable work skills, and educational attainment.  A simplified grid, compiled by 
Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), is given in Appendix Table 1.  In general, the likelihood of an 
accepted claim should increase with age, decrease with residual functional capacity, decrease 
with transferrable work skills, and decrease with educational attainment. 
 A study by Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) show that the use of the grid is evident in 
the award rates of actual disability claims.  The authors note that, because of the grid’s 
categorization of age, the likelihood of an accepted claim should increase discretely at ages 50 
and 55. Additionally, this increase should be evident only among claims that reach stage five.  
(In the authors’ data, 40 percent of all claims reach this stage.)  To examine if this is the case, the 
                                                          
1 The grid is used only when the claimant presents an exertional impairment. 
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authors model the likelihood of an award at stage five as a piece-wise linear function of age, with 
discontinuities at ages 50 and 55.  Using administrative data, the authors show that the likelihood 
of an award increases by 9.3 percentage points at age 50 and by 28.7 percentage points at age 55.   
B. Source of Identification 
 The objective of this study is to measure the effect of disability insurance on labor 
supply.  To this end, the study exploits a policy change in 1990 to the Spouse’s Disability 
Benefits program, also known as the disabled-widow program.  Prior to 1990, the disabled-
widow program operated under a stricter disability standard than the other Title II programs.  In 
particular, the Social Security Administration required that a claimant for disabled-widow 
benefits must have a condition that meets or equals a condition on the Listing of Impairments, 
determined at the third step of the sequential evaluation process.  If a claimant’s condition was 
not on the Listing, the claim was denied.  In contrast, under the other disability programs, if a 
claimant’s condition did not meet or equal a condition on the Listing, the claim would proceed to 
stages four and five, where vocational factors are considered.  Several courts challenged the 
stricter standard for disabled widows, and in 1990, Congress abrogated the stricter standard of 
the disabled-widow program to equal the standard of the other Title II programs.2  The relaxing 
of the disability standard effectively increased the generosity of disability insurance benefits for 
widows. 
The increase in benefit generosity may have affected several important economic 
outcomes.  Of first-order importance is its effect on benefit receipt among widows.  This effect is 
                                                          
2 According to the Social Security Advisory Board’s, “Aspects of Disability Decision Making: 
Data and Materials,” important court cases involving widows include Hill (NY), Askin (11th 
Circuit), Begley (TN), and Bozzi (3rd Circuit).  
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evident in Figure 1, which shows that receipt of disabled-widow benefits increased by 5 
percentage points.  Another question is whether the rise in benefit receipt led to a decrease in 
labor supply, as beneficiaries who earn more than the substantial gainful amount risk losing their 
benefits.  The effects on benefit receipt and labor supply may have also led to changes in other 
outcomes, such as private insurance coverage, poverty, and self-reported disability status.  These 
effects are estimated in the sections below. 
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
 The economic effects of disability insurance generosity are measured using a difference-
in-differences estimator.  According to the estimator, the effect of the reform on a particular 
outcome variable is measured by the change in the variable among the treatment group relative 
to the change in the variable among a comparison group, where the changes are measured from 
before to after the reform.  The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the reform, the 
change in the outcome variable for both groups would be the same. 
For this study, the treatment group is defined as female widows who are ages 50 to 59 
and who do not have a high school diploma.  The focus on widows, and not widowers, is because 
all recipients of disabled-widow benefits are female (97.4 percent in 2000).  The age range is 
because eligibility for disabled-widow benefits begins at age 50 and eligibility for the aged-
widow program begins at age 60.  Finally, the focus on lower educated females reflects that, at 
step five of the sequential evaluation process, the medical-vocational grid is more generous to 
less-educated, less-skilled applicants.   The comparison group is defined as female divorcees 
who are ages 50 to 59 and who also lack a high school diploma. 
The difference-in-differences estimator is measured using the following regression: 
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𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖. 
The term 𝑌𝑖 is the outcome variable of interest.  The outcome may be continuous, such as the 
amount of Social Security benefits, or Bernoulli, such as an indicator of Social Security receipt.  
When the outcome variable is Bernoulli, the regression is a linear probability model.  The 
variable 𝑃𝑖 is a period indicator, equaling one after the reform and zero before the reform. The 
variable 𝑇𝑖 is a treatment indicator, equaling one for the treatment group and zero for the 
comparison group.  The vector 𝑋𝑖 contains control variables, which includes age, its square, and 
indicators of race (black and other relative to white).  𝛽𝑠 represents state fixed effects, and  𝛽𝑡 
represents yearly fixed effects, which are identified separately from 𝛽2 if the periods span more 
than one year.  The term 𝜀𝑖 is a robust standard error. 
 The difference-in-differences estimator is given by the coefficient 𝛽1.  The coefficient 
reflects the change in the outcome variable for the treatment group, after controlling for baseline 
differences between the treatment and comparison groups, measured by 𝛽3, and trend in the 
outcome variable shared by both groups, measured by 𝛽2.  If the identification assumption holds, 
then the 𝛽1 measures the causal effect of the reform among the treated group. 
B. Data and Sample 
 The data come from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey.  The 
survey is conducted annually and, with proper weighting, is representative of the non-
institutionalized US population.  Initially, the data used for the analysis include years 1983 to 
2002, which spans well before and after the policy in 1990.  However, for the regression 
equation above, the pre-reform period is defined as survey years 1986 to 1990, and the post-
reform years is defined as 1998 to 2002.  Starting the post-reform period in the late 1990s allows 
time for the policy to affect aggregate measures of the outcome variables.   
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Panel (A) of Table 1 presents summary statistics of the treatment and comparison groups 
during the pre-reform period.  The first set of variables on age and race are used as control 
variables for the regression equation above.  As shown, widowed females are older than divorced 
females, but their racial compositions are almost identical, with widowed females being slightly 
less likely to be white and slightly more likely to be of another race. 
The next two variables are measures of disability benefit receipt, which serve as outcome 
variables for the regression equation.  The first variable is an indicator of Social Security receipt, 
and the second is the amount of Social Security benefits received (measured in 1990$ using 
Social Security’s average wage index).  As shown, widowed females are more likely to receive 
Social Security benefits - and to receive greater amounts - than divorced females.  A limitation of 
these variables is that they reflect income from all Social Security programs, not just the 
disabled-widow program, such as disabled-worker benefits or child-in-care benefits for widows.3   
(The figures do not likely reflect aged-widow benefits or old-age benefits, as eligibility for these 
programs begin at age 60 and 62, respectively.)  Nonetheless, the difference-in-differences 
estimator may still be interpreted as the effect of the reform on disabled-widow benefits, 
assuming that changes in benefit receipt from the other programs are similar among treatment 
and comparison groups. 
An additional measure of disability benefit receipt, and the next variable in Table 1, is 
Medicare coverage.  This is because beneficiaries become automatically eligible for Medicare 
after two years of disability benefit receipt.  The only other way to receive Medicare coverage 
                                                          
3 A widow may receive both disabled-widow benefits and disabled-worker benefits, but due to 
program rules, the combined benefit generally does not exceed the full widow benefit (Weaver 
2010). 
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before age 65 is to be diagnosed with end-stage renal disease, and according to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, these cases represented only 1.3 percent of Medicare enrollees 
under the age of 65.  (At age 65 and beyond, Medicare eligibility is universal.)  An advantage of 
Medicare coverage as a measure of disability benefit receipt is that, unlike Social Security 
income, it does not likely reflect receipt of child-in-care benefits for widows.  A disadvantage is 
that it systematically underestimates disability benefit receipt among new enrollees, which may 
bias downward the estimated effect of the policy on the receipt of disabled-widow benefits.4  As 
shown, Medicare coverage is similar among widowed and divorced females: 0.091 and 0.080.  
This contrasts with rates of Social Security receipt, which was higher among widowed females.  
This difference likely reflects that widows are receiving child-in-care benefits.  
The final two variables are measures of labor supply, which also serve as outcome 
variables.  The first variable is labor force participation, which includes both the employed and 
the unemployed.  The second variable is employment, regardless of labor force participation 
status.  The purpose of both variables is to distinguish whether those who change their labor 
force participation status would have otherwise been employed.  As shown, widows are 8.1 
percentage points less likely to participate in the labor force and 7.1 percentage points less likely 
to be employed. 
 
IV. Results 
A. Graphical Analysis 
                                                          
4 In 1999, the ratio of Medicare enrollees to disability insurance beneficiaries under the age of 65 
was 0.796, which suggests that 20.4 percent of disability insurance beneficiaries had been on the 
program for less than two years. 
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 Before proceeding to the regression results, it is useful to illustrate changes in Social 
Security benefits, Medicare coverage, and labor supply over time.  Figure 2 plots the two 
measures of Social Security benefits: Social Security receipt and Social Security income.  The 
figures include estimates from 1983 to 2002.  While both trends are noisy - which likely reflects 
both sampling error and measurement error - both trends appear to increase over time.  In all 
years, Social Security benefits are greater among widowed females, but become appreciably 
higher during some years in the late 1990s. 
 Figure 3 plots Medicare coverage, the additional measure of disability benefit receipt.  
Because Medicare coverage lags benefit receipt by two years, the figures are estimated among 
females ages 52 to 59.  (Eligibility for disabled-widow benefits begins at age 50).  Again, the 
trends are noisy, but several notable patterns emerge.  First, Medicare coverage is more similar 
between the two groups than the receipt of Social Security income.  Second, both groups exhibit 
similar upward trends in Medicare coverage just around and before 1990.  This provides some 
assurance that the identification assumption of the difference-in-differences estimator – that both 
groups would exhibit similar trends in the absence of the reform – is valid.  And third, Medicare 
coverage appears to increase systematically among widows during the post-reform years. 
 Figure 4 plots the two measures of labor supply: labor force participation and 
employment.  In all years, labor supply is lower among widowed females.  More importantly, 
both groups show similar trends in labor supply up until the early 1990s, which again supports 
the identification assumption of the difference-in-differences estimator.  Thereafter, the labor 
supply of widowed females declines relative to divorced widows, suggesting that the policy may 
have decreased labor force participation and employment.         
B. Regression Results 
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 The regression results from the difference-in-differences model are reported in Table 2.  
Again, the pre-reform period is defined as 1986 to 1990, and the post-reform period is defined as 
1998 to 2002.  The coefficient of interest is on the interaction between the post-reform indicator 
and the treatment group indicator, labeled as “Post*Treat” in the table. 
 Columns (1) and (2) show the estimated effect of the policy on Social Security benefits. 
As shown, the reform increased receipt of any Social Security income by an estimated 5.2 
percentage points and increased Social Security income by $301 (in 1990$).  Both estimates are 
statistically significant at the five percent level.  The increase in benefit receipt is similar to the 5 
percentage point increase in disabled-widow benefits in Figure 1. 
 Column (3) shows the estimated effect of the policy on Medicare coverage.  The sample 
size declines from columns (1) and (2) because the model is estimated among females ages 52 to 
59.  As shown, the reform increased coverage by an estimated 6.3 percentage points, which is 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  When the sample is expanded to include ages 50 
to 59, the point estimate declines to 0.060 (standard error: 0.020), but remains statistically 
significant.  These estimates for Medicare coverage are not statistically different from the 
estimate for Social Security receipt reported in column (1).   
 Finally, columns (4) and (5) show the estimated effect of the policy on labor force 
participation.  As shown, the policy decreased labor force participation by 5.3 percentage points 
and employment by 4.8 percentage points.  These estimates are similar in magnitude to the 
percentage point changes in Social Security receipt and Medicare coverage.  Taken together, the 
results suggest that, in this context, the expansion of benefit receipt led to a one-for-one 
reduction in labor force participation.  It also suggests that the decline in labor force participation 
was driven by those who would have otherwise been employed. 
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 A concern with the labor supply estimates in columns (4) and (5) is that the coefficient 
for labor force participation is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level and that the 
coefficient for employment is statistically insignificant.  One way to increase statistical precision, 
without drastically changing the estimates themselves, is to increase the number of years in the 
periods.  For example, when the post-reform period covers years 1996 to 2002, the difference-in-
differences estimate for labor force participation and employment are -0.0544 (standard error: 
0.027) and -0.048 (standard error: 0.027), respectively.  However, the coefficients on Social 
Security receipt and income change to -0.025 (standard error: 0.021) and -$145 (standard error: 
145), respectively.  Mentioned above, the sensitivity of the estimates for Social Security benefits 
may reflect both sampling error and measurement error.  Nonetheless, the difference-in-
differences estimate for Medicare remains robust and statistically significant: -0.048 (standard 
error: 0.020).   
B. High School Diploma or More 
 In the previous analysis, the sample is restricted to females with less than a high school 
diploma.  This is because, at step five of the sequential evaluation process, the medical-
vocational grid is more generous to less-educated, less-skilled applicants.  Thus, as a placebo 
test, the difference-in-differences model is re-estimated using females with a high school 
diploma or more.  The logic of the placebo test is that, if the results in Table 2 are driven by the 
reform, then there should be little to no change in benefit receipt, Medicare coverage, or labor 
force participation among the more educated. 
 Summary statistics of more educated females are presented in panel (B) of Table 1, and 
the estimates from the difference-in-difference model are presented in Table 3.  As shown, none 
of the difference-in-differences estimates among more educated females are economically or 
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statistically significant.  These null effects provide further support that the difference-in-
differences estimates in Table 2 reflect the causal effects of the policy.  
C. Additional Outcome Variables 
 Taken together, the results suggest that the policy increased benefit receipt and decreased 
labor supply, particularly among widows with less than a high school diploma.  The changes in 
benefit receipt and labor supply, in turn, may have affected other outcomes, such as private 
insurance coverage, poverty, and self-reported disability status. 
 Table 4 shows summary statistics of additional outcomes variables.  As before, the 
treatment group is widowed females ages 50 to 59 who do not have a high school diploma, and 
the comparison group is divorced females ages 50 to 59 who do not have a high school diploma.  
The first two variables reflect receipt of Supplement Security Income (SSI), a separate disability 
insurance program targeted to the low-income disabled.  The disability standard for SSI is 
similar to the disabled-worker program and, more importantly, did not change differentially for 
the treatment and comparison groups during the period of analysis.  As such, there should be no 
direct effect of the policy on SSI receipt, though the increase in disabled-widow benefits may 
have crowded out SSI benefits, since the latter are income-tested. As shown in Table 4, widowed 
females are less likely to receive SSI benefits than divorced females. 
 The next two variables are related to health insurance coverage: private health insurance 
coverage and any health insurance coverage.  The policy may have decreased private health 
insurance coverage in two ways.  First, the policy may have decreased private health insurance 
through one’s employer by decreasing in employment.  And second, the policy may have 
crowded out private forms of health insurance by expanding Medicare coverage.  The net effect 
of the policy on health insurance coverage is measured by the second variable, an indicator of 
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any health insurance.  As shown in the table, both measures of health insurance are similar 
among widowed and divorced females. 
 The next variable is indicator of poverty status, which is defined as being at or below 150 
percent of the poverty line measured at the family level.  The change in poverty is intended to 
measure the net effect of the policy on family income and, to some extent, economic well-being.  
The final variable is self-reported disability status.  This variable is intended to measure whether 
self-reported disability is endogenous to the generosity of disability insurance.5  As shown in the 
table, rates of poverty and self-reported disability are also similar between the two groups. 
 The estimates from the difference-in-differences model are presented in Table 5.  
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates for SSI receipt and income, respectively.  As expected, 
the reform had little to no effect on SSI benefits.  The null effects also suggest that there were no 
differential declines in the health of widows, which further supporting the claim that the 
estimates in Table 2 represent causal effects of the reform. 
 The estimates for health insurance coverage are presented in columns (3) and (4).  As 
shown, private health insurance coverage declined by 5.5 percentage points, but there was 
relatively no change in any health insurance coverage.  Interestingly, the point estimate for 
private health insurance is similar in absolute value to the point estimate for Medicare coverage 
in Table 2.  These results have two implications. First, in this context, the expansion of Medicare 
coverage led to a one-for-one decline in private health insurance.  On net, overall health 
coverage did not change.  And second, the demand for disability benefits is not likely driven by a 
                                                          
5 This issue is explored by Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Cheidvasser, and Rust (2004); 
Bound (1991), and Singleton (2009), to name a few. 
16 
 
latent demand for health insurance coverage, since the rise in benefit receipt appears to have 
occurred among those who were previously covered by private health insurance. 
 Columns (5) and (6) report the estimates for poverty and self-reported disability.  As 
shown, the difference-in-differences estimate is positive for both outcomes, but neither estimate 
is statistically significant.  The regression results for poverty do not change appreciably when 
poverty is defined as below the poverty line or below 125 percent of the poverty line.  Thus, the 
effects of disability insurance generosity on poverty and self-reported disability remain 
inconclusive. 
  
V. Conclusion 
 This study measures the economic effects of disability insurance.  The effects are 
identified by a policy reform in 1990 to Social Security’s disabled widow program. According to 
the results, the expansion of the disability insurance program led to substantial declines in labor 
force participation, employment, and private health insurance coverage. 
 The results make two substantive contributions to the literature.  First, the effects on labor 
supply fall at the high end of results in related studies.  This may reflect the unique population of 
interest: widowed females ages 50 to 59 who lack a high school diploma.  This group likely 
represents a substantial proportion of disability claims, as the policy reform increased benefit 
generosity by considering vocational factors in the disability determination process.  And second, 
the effects on private health insurance suggest that the demand for disability benefits does not 
reflect a latent demand for public health insurance coverage.  In fact, the results suggest a one-to-
one crowd out of benefit receipt and Medicare coverage on private health insurance coverage.  
On net, health insurance coverage did not change. 
Appendix Table 1 
Medical Vocational Grid 
  
Illiterate  
 
1st to 6th Grade 
 
7th to 11th Grade 
 
High School or 
More 
Residual Capacity Age Unskilled Skilled   Unskilled Skilled   Unskilled Skilled   Unskilled Skilled 
Sedentary 60-64 D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
55-59 D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
50-54 D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
45-49 D N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
 
18-45 N N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
             Light 60-64 D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
55-59 D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
D D 
 
50-54 D D 
 
N N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
 
45-49 N N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
 
18-45 N N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
             Medium 60-64 D N 
 
D N 
 
D N 
 
N N 
 
55-59 D N 
 
N(D) N 
 
N(D) N 
 
N N 
 
50-54 N N 
 
N  N 
 
N  N 
 
N N 
 
45-49 N N 
 
N  N 
 
N N 
 
N N 
  18-45 N N   N N   N N   N N 
Note: "D" indicates disabled, and "N" indicates not disabled. 
Source: Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) 
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Table 1 
     Summary Statistics: Females Ages 50 to 59  
  
(A) Less than High 
School Diploma   
(B) High School 
Diploma or More 
  Widowed Divorced   Widowed Divorced 
Age (years) 55.6 54.4 
 
55.3 54.1 
 
(0.077) (0.075) 
 
(0.058) (0.048) 
White 0.686 0.695 
 
0.846 0.813 
 
(0.013) (0.012) 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Black 0.268 0.269 
 
0.124 0.158 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
 
(0.007) (0.006) 
Other Race 0.046 0.036 
 
0.031 0.029 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
College degree 
   
0.350 0.456 
    
(0.010) (0.008) 
Social Security Receipt 0.190 0.102 
 
0.112 0.043 
 
(0.011) (0.008) 
 
(0.007) (0.003) 
Social Security Income 912 438 
 
560 197 
     (1990$) (61.9) (39.9) 
 
(38.2) (17.4) 
Medicare 0.091 0.080 
 
0.049 0.029 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
 
(0.005) (0.003) 
Labor Force Participation 0.439 0.520 
 
0.686 0.827 
 
(0.014) (0.013) 
 
(0.010) (0.006) 
Employment 0.411 0.482 
 
0.663 0.795 
 
(0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.010) (0.007) 
      Observations 1334 1476   2287 3517 
Note: The figures are estimated using the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey, 
survey years 1986 to 1990.  All figures are in percent unless otherwise noted.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 
     Linear Probability Models: Females Ages 50 to 59 with Less than a High School Diploma 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Social 
Security 
Receipt 
Social 
Security 
Income Medicare 
Labor force 
participation Employment 
Post*Treat 0.052 301 0.063 -0.053 -0.048 
 
(0.024)** (128)** (0.023)*** (0.030)* (0.030) 
Post 0.023 138 0.025 -0.032 -0.051 
 
(0.027) (133) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036) 
Treat 0.072 41 -0.018 -0.058 -0.051 
 
(0.014)*** (79.0)*** -0.012 (0.019)*** (0.019)*** 
Age -0.104 -809 -0.278 0.142 0.066 
 
(0.078) (420)* (0.122)** (0.108) (0.107) 
Age2 0.001 7.64 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (3.86)** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) 
Black 0.025 34.8 0.03 -0.019 -0.034 
 
(0.014)* (67.9) (0.014)** (0.018) (0.018)* 
Other -0.038 -272 0.013 -0.125 -0.121 
 
(0.024) (112)** -0.025 (0.034)*** (0.034)*** 
      Observations 4798 4798 4002 4798 4798 
Note: The figures are estimated using the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey.  
The pre-reform period covers survey years 1986 to 1990, and the post-reform period covers 
survey years 1998 to 2002.  The treatment group is defined as widowed females, and the 
comparison group is defined as divorced females.  In specification (3), the sample is restricted to 
ages 52 to 59.   Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 
     Linear Probability Models: Females Ages 50 to 59 with a High School Diploma or More 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Social 
Security 
Receipt 
Social 
Security 
Income Medicare 
Labor Force 
Participation Employment 
Post*Treat 0.008 71.9 0.007 0.005 0.00 
 
(0.011) (69.0) (0.010) (0.016) (0.017) 
Post 0.022 264 0.026 -0.045 -0.038 
 
(0.010)** (72.3)*** (0.011)** (0.016)*** (0.017)** 
Treat 0.065 338 0.018 -0.122 -0.116 
 
(0.008)*** (42.8)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** 
Age -0.017 -147 0.01 0.024 0.066 
 
(0.033) (211) (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) 
Age2 0.00 1.44 0.00 0.00 -0.001 
 
(0.00) (1.93) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Black 0.026 92.6 0.037 -0.077 -0.08 
 
(0.007)*** (412)** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
Other -0.006 -18.116 0.005 -0.031 -0.031 
 
(0.012) (104) (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) 
      Observations 14678 14678 11399 14678 14678 
Note: The figures are estimated using the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey.  
The pre-reform period covers survey years 1986 to 1990, and the post-reform period covers 
survey years 1998 to 2002.  The treatment group is defined as widowed females, and the 
comparison group is defined as divorced females. In specification (3), the sample is restricted to 
ages 52 to 59.   Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4 
  Summary Statistics: Females Ages 50 to 59 with Less than a High School Diploma 
  Less than High School Diploma 
  Widowed Divorced 
   Supplemental Security Income  0.113 0.162 
     Receipt (0.009) (0.010) 
Supplement Security Income 345 569 
     (1990$) (31.7) (39.7) 
Private Health Insurance 0.397 0.376 
 
(0.018) (0.017) 
Any Health Insurance 0.682 0.696 
 
(0.017) (0.016) 
Poverty 0.559 0.586 
 
(0.018) (0.017) 
Self-Reported Disability 0.318 0.334 
 
(0.017) (0.016) 
   Observations 1334 1476 
Note: The figures are estimated using the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey, 
survey years 1986 to 1990.  For the last four variables, the number of observations is 773 and 
848 for widowed and divorced females, respectively.  All figures are in percent unless otherwise 
noted.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 5 
Linear Probability Models: Females Ages 50 to 59 with Less than a High School Diploma 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Supplemental 
Security Income 
Receipt 
Supplemental 
Security Income 
Private Health 
Insurance 
Any Health 
Insurance Poverty 
Self-Reported 
Disability 
Post*Treat 0.016 -60.3 -0.055 -0.013 0.039 0.046 
 
(0.022) (82.1) (0.033)* (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) 
Post 0.039 200 -0.072 -0.032 0.052 0.064 
 
(0.028) (102)** (0.035)** (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)* 
Treat -0.059 -229 0.013 -0.035 -0.043 -0.038 
 
(0.013)*** (52.0)*** (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)* (0.024) 
Age -0.049 -132 -0.066 -0.041 -0.268 0.092 
 
(0.079) (312) (0.120) (0.116) (0.123)** (0.119) 
Age2 0.001 1.43 0.001 0 0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (2.86) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) 
Black 0.059 216 -0.075 0.01 0.084 0.018 
 
(0.015)*** (59.3)*** (0.021)*** (0.020) (0.021)*** (0.021) 
Other 0.048 219 -0.115 0.03 -0.027 0.018 
 
(0.027)* (106)** (0.035)*** (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) 
       Observations 4798 4798 3609 3609 3609 3609 
Note: The figures are estimated using the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey.  The pre-reform period covers survey 
years 1986 to 1990, and the post-reform period covers survey years 1998 to 2002.  The treatment group is defined as widowed 
females, and the comparison group is defined as divorced females.  In specifications (3), (4), (5), and (6), the sample size declines 
because the outcome variable is not available before 1988.   Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Figure 1: Receipt of Disabled Widow(er) and Disabled Worker Benefits: Ages 50 to 64 
Note: Benefit receipt is calculated as the number of beneficiaries in current payment status divided by the 
size of the population.  The number of disabled widow(er) benefits is calculated from the Social Security 
Administration's Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (SSA).  
The number of disabled worker benefits is calculated from the Social Security Administration's Annual 
Statistical Supplement (SSA).  The size of the population is estimated from the March Supplement of the 
Current Population Survey. 
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Figure 2: Social Security: Females Ages 50 to 59 
Data: Current Population Survey 
Note: The pre-reform period corresponds with survey years 1986 to 1990, and the post-reform period 
corresponds with survey years 1998 to 2002.   
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 Figure 3: Medicare: Females Ages 52 to 59 
Data: Current Population Survey 
Note: The pre-reform period corresponds with survey years 1986 to 1990, and the post-reform period 
corresponds with survey years 1998 to 2002.   
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Figure 4: Labor Supply: Females Ages 50 to 59 
Data: Current Population Survey 
Note: The pre-reform period corresponds with survey years 1986 to 1990, and the post-reform period 
corresponds with survey years 1998 to 2002.   
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